THE VOLATILITY of the dollar in the last several years has led to serious second thoughts worldwide about the desirability of a system of floating exchange rates. The emergence of dissatisfaction was predictable. The exchange rate is the most important price of any nation's economy after the wage rate, and the wage rate is splintered into thousands of fragments. Firms are deeply upset by price movements they do not understand. Economists may have the best of the argument when they say that the total uncertainty in the economic system is not increased by flexible exchange rates, although even that judgment depends on assessments of the extent to which an exchange rate commitment can "discipline" national economic policies and also on the prevalence of autonomous bandwagon movements in the foreign exchange market. But that conclusion is no consolation to those in the goods-producing heart of the economy who feel directly the impact of foreign price fluctuations. For them uncertainty has risen, and I predict that it will prove to be intolerable and that they will insist on political action to reduce it.
figure amounting to about half of gross national product. If debt continues to grow much more rapidly than GNP, an ever larger share of income will eventually have to be taxed in order to service it. Furthermore, much of the debt, or its equivalent in private obligations, is accruing not to Americans but to foreigners, the financial counterpart of the large U.S. trade deficit, which is being financed by borrowing abroad. In 1984 the United States imported (net) $107 billion in capital from abroad, more than the entire Brazilian external debt, and in 1985 this figure rose to $118 billion. Without corrective action, the United States will have borrowed half a trillion dollars from abroad between 1983 and 1987, a debt that can be serviced only out of future income. That would be no special problem if the foreign funds were being invested at rates of return to American investors in excess of the cost of borrowing. But U.S. domestic investment has not been exceptionally strong in recent years, and the foreign loans have been used to finance public spending with little or no future economic yield.
The United States has in effect borrowed against its future income to enjoy immediate consumption, both public and private. Servicing the external debt will mean lower living standards for the future, both because of interest to be paid to foreign lenders and because of the deterioration in the terms of trade necessary to generate the trade surplus required to service the debt. The primary burden will fall mainly on the working population, which already faces the burden of supporting the growing number of social security recipients.
With its large trade deficit, the configuration of the U.S. economy poses an unacceptable threat to the liberal trading system and imposes an unwarranted burden on future generations of Americans. This says nothing of the anomaly, from a global perspective, of the world's richest country being the largest net importer of capital. To head off these problems requires a substantial reduction in both the U.S. budget deficit and current account deficit.
Shifts in Policy
A look at saving and investment in the U.S. economy suggests strongly the desirability of a reduction in the budget deficit. From the national accounts identity, net foreign investment (approximately the balance on goods and services) must equal the excess of national saving (the sum of private saving and the government surplus) over domestic investment.
As table 1 suggests, gross private saving, including corporate retained earnings and capital consumption allowances, was exceptionally high in 1984, while gross domestic investment at 17.9 percent of GNP was only slightly above normal for a boom year. What was not normal for a boom year was the large public deficit, which absorbed private saving and required an inflow of resources from the rest of the world to cover the normal investment. If the government accounts had been in balance (state and local governments actually showed a surplus of $64 billion, or 1.7 percent of GNP, in 1984), the United States on this accounting would have produced a healthy and not abnormal trade surplus in goods and services, about 0.5 percent of GNP. So long as the federal government deficit runs 4 to 5 percent of GNP, the United States can be expected to run a substantial trade deficit except in a period of deep recession, when domestic investment falls way off. It is not realistic to expect an increase in private saving large enough to balance the external accounts, particularly since aggregate private saving is not consistently and predictably responsive to alterations in public policy.
A substantial reduction in the budget deficit, therefore, is a necessary condition for a substantial improvement in the trade balance with the economy operating at anything like current levels of activity. The need for deficit reduction is increasingly recognized, and both Congress and the president accept it. Sharp disagreements still exist on how fast the deficit should be reduced and, more important, on how it should be reduced. Moreover, sharp discrepancies between declared policies and actions suggest that skillful political posturing is more important to the key actors than the actions actually taken. Nonetheless, prospects for deficit reductions are much better now than they were a year ago.
In 
The Role of Exchange Rates
The other component of demand that could in principle and should in practice take up the slack created by fiscal contraction is net exports. There is no shortage of industrial and agricultural capacity to expand exports: despite economic recovery since 1982, the entire U.S. tradable sector has been depressed by foreign competition. The obvious solution to competitiveness problems is a low value of the dollar relative to other major currencies, particularly the yen and the European currencies.
The United States found itself last fall in a situation in some respects analogous to that of many less developed countries: it faced a large payments deficit caused mainly by an expansionist fiscal policy. The important difference was that the U.S. budget deficit had not been monetized-indeed monetary policy had been rather tight-and the United States had been able to finance its current account deficit by borrowing abroad. (With flexible exchange rates the causation actually ran from capital inflows to trade deficit; the financing occurred first, so to speak.) And the remedy was also analogous: the budget deficit must be reduced to reduce the trade deficit, but to avoid economic recession the currency must be devalued to provide incremental external demand to compensate for the reduction in domestic demand.
One way to pose the problem is to note that the Gramm-Rudman targets entail cutting the high-employment budget deficit by about $120 billion, roughly 3 percent of GNP, over the period 1985-88. Since the most urgent reason for reducing the budget deficit was to reduce the trade deficit, it seemed appropriate that the trade sector make up the bulk of this loss in demand.
The new Group of Five initiatives of September 22, 1985, were an attempt to address the trade balance problem by operating directly on the exchange rate. Although Gramm-Rudman had not been passed, policymakers probably contemplated a declining path for future budget deficits. The new initiatives did raise important questions. Could the dollar be depreciated without a change in fundamentals or a return to Is it possible for economic officials to "talk down" the exchange rate in opposition to the economic fundamentals? Most economists would answer with an unequivocal "no." Their models do not allow it. The more pertinent question, however, is whether the market will respond at once to changes in the fundamentals in the way that currently popular portfolio-balance rational expectations models suggest that it will. Will a credible reduction in future budget deficits really lead to an immediate and appropriate drop in long-term interest rates and depreciation of the country's currency? My guess is that the world does not work that way. Unclarities about the present and uncertainties about the future create a sluggishness in exchange market response and lead market participants to give little weight to the future beyond, say, the next year or two.1 Exchange market expectations are fragile, weakly held, and subject to crowd effects. Under these circumstances, official announcements reinforced by even modest supporting action can have a strong impact on exchange rates.
There will be a lively debate during the next few years over the respective roles in producing the sharp drop in the dollar over the past year of (1) the foreign exchange market coming to its senses, (2) improving prospects for reduction in the federal budget deficit, (3) easier U.S. monetary policy starting in early 1985, (4) a temporary tightening of monetary policy by Japan in October 1985, (5) exchange market intervention on a considerable scale, especially by Japan, and (6) announcements of concern about the prevailing exchange rates by finance ministry , 1985) , pp. 129, 169. But Marris allows for the large accumulation of external debt that will occur over the several years it will take to reestablish balance, whereas the objective here is to offset the contractionary fiscal impact, not to restore full current account balance. Needless to say, all these exchange rate calculations presuppose stipulated rates of growth and demand pressures in the major countries, as well as targets for the current account.
204
Brookings Paipers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 account. Moreover, 14 percent of U.S. merchandise exports in 1984 went to oil-exporting countries, compared with 11 percent for Japan and 8 percent for Germany, so the drop in oil prices is likely to have a proportionately greater negative effect on U.S. exports. On both counts, that would require some further appreciation of the yen, to around 175, and some depreciation of the British pound. Taking all these points together, the dollar-yen and dollar-pound rates were probably about right by April 1986, although the German mark and other EMS currencies were still undervalued by 5-10 percent. Of course, from the U.S. perspective alone, a stronger yen could compensate for a weak mark. And to the extent that neither Japan nor Germany engages in greater domestic stimulus, both currencies were still too weak for the purpose discussed here. On the other hand, the drop in oil prices will provide some stimulus to U.S. domestic demand in 1987-88, once the initial negative impact has passed.
The fall in the dollar's exchange rate has been so dramatic that it has generated some concern that the dollar would fall too far too quickly. However, I believe it has been appropriate to bring the dollar down as rapidly as possible. There are several reasons for preferring this course despite the general proposition that gradual adjustment of economic variables is normally less costly than rapid adjustment.
First, changes in monetary policy and in exchange rates affect demand for goods and services only gradually, whereas expenditure cuts affect demand rapidly. Therefore, exchange rate action must precede budget cuts.
Second, a sharp, well-defined drop in the dollar reduces foreign investors' uncertainties about future declines. Inevitably the United States will have to continue borrowing abroad during the next several years, for a cumulative total of several hundred billion dollars. So long as the dollar is expected to drop, foreigners will hesitate to lend unless U.S. interest rates are high enough to compensate for the expected decline. Yet on domestic grounds, and for the good of the world economy as well, U.S. interest rates should fall further, not rise. Thus it is preferable to have a sharp drop in the dollar and to impose the inevitable capital losses sooner rather than later. Bygones will then be bygones, and foreigners will be willing to continue to lend, even at low interest rates, on the basis of the new, cheaper dollar.
Third, a depreciation of the dollar was necessary sooner or later, and whenever it came, it would have led to price increases for imported goods and for those domestic goods in close competition with them. The inflation gains that the United States "borrowed" from the future when the dollar appreciated so sharply have to be repaid. It is usually estimated that each 10 percent real depreciation of the dollar will lead eventually to increases in the consumer price index of 1-2 percent. Rudiger Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer estimate that the direct impact on prices is 1.25 percent, occurring after a mean lag of three quarters, with a total effect of 2.1 percent operating through induced wage increases as well.6 If the total effect is spread over two to four years, it will be lost in all of the other pressures that are also operating, and it will be impossible, without economic slack and higher unemployment, both of which are undesirable, to prevent these price increases from having their full impact on wage increases. But if the inflationary impact comes relatively quickly, as part of a deliberate and well-explained program, there is at least a chance that it will not be passed fully into wage increases. That chance is fortunately increased at present by the sharp drop in oil prices, which could greatly ease the pain of the inevitable inflationary impact of dollar depreciation. Insofar as prices do rise from a once-for-all drop in the dollar, the increase should be accompanied by a less-than-proportionate once-for-all increase in the money supply to avoid the contractionary impact of the higher prices. In short, monetary targets should be raised for 1986, but not for subsequent years.
A fourth argument for a sharp rather than a gradual drop in the dollar is that it puts early and strong pressure on other leading countries, especially Japan and Germany, to back off from their fiscal contraction and their reliance on export-led growth. These countries are too large to rely on export-led growth (over half of the new orders for capital goods in Germany during 1985 were foreign orders, substantially more than the 30 percent share of exports in Germany's GNP), especially when there are unemployed resources at home and when many countries around the world are in desperate need of export markets.
An objection sometimes raised to a rapid, deliberate depreciation of the dollar is that it will get out of control and go too far. Furthermore, a sense of loss of control over a depreciating dollar might so unnerve the financial and business community that investor caution would nullify the stimulative effects of dollar depreciation. Such concern cannot be completely dismissed. It underlines the importance of how the policy is executed and the clarity with which the broad strategy, if not the specific numerical targets, must be explained. Bandwagon effects in which market sentiment derives solely from market sentiment can be influenced by official action. Moreover, a slow decline in the dollar is also subject to bandwagon effects after a time, the more so if the expected decline in the dollar is not compensated by a higher interest yield, as already noted.
The foregoing analysis assumes that the U.S. budget deficit should be gradually reduced and that, with the Gramm-Rudman act, the deficit is on a declining path. However, exclusive reliance on expenditure cuts is not the best way to reduce the deficit. Indeed, one wonders whether President Reagan has ever troubled to look at the numbers involved. If one protects from cuts both defense and social security, as he desires, and also interest payments, as everyone takes for granted, then in fiscal year 1986 only an estimated $282 billion in government expenditures remain, as against a projected deficit, before automatic Gramm-Rudman cuts, of $220 billion. In other words, to eliminate the deficit exclusively by cutting unprotected expenditures would require virtual elimination of government beyond the Defense Department and a bare-bones Department of Health and Human Services. Eighty percent of the remainder-law enforcement, foreign affairs, highways and airports and parks, welfare and health programs (other than medicare), space, energy, agriculture, and so on-would have to go. This is not going to happen. Either defense and social security will have to be cut consequentially, or some form of tax increase will be necessary.
Viewed from the perspective of last fall, macroeconomic policy for the United States required a firm commitment to reduce the federal budget deficit, but gradually so as to permit actions that would avoid a recession; a tax increase as a part of the fiscal action; expansionary monetary policy to help counteract the contractionary fiscal action; and a sharp drop in the value of the dollar brought about partly by exchange market intervention and partly by jawboning.
Some of these policy actions have already been taken or are under way. The drop in the dollar is an essential part of this policy package, and the specific actions taken last September have been appropriate and effective. The dollar's decline will help offset the fiscal contraction through expansion of net exports, help maintain overall U.S. economic activity at a satisfactory level, and head off the strong protectionist pressures that, in the peculiar political circumstances of 1986, might erupt into damaging protectionist action.
